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I. INTRODUCTION
T he authors hope to make, or rather to restate, the case for the
protection of reports and information generated during internal
"EEO Officer, Eastern Kentucky University. B.A. 1973, Berea College; J.D.
1986, University of Kentucky. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which they are
affiliated or employed.
"" Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
B.S. 1969, J.D. 1976, The Ohio State University.
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investigations at public colleges and universities. The results of an informal
survey of university lawyers and Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO")
officers conducted by one of the authors prior to a presentation at the
June, 2000 National Association of College and University Attorneys
("NACUA") Conference' suggest that steps routinely are not taken by
university counsel and investigators to assert the attorney-client and work
product privileges and protect the fruits of internal investigations from
disclosure. This seems odd, since the protection of internal corporate
investigations has been a priority, and a "hot topic,, 2 ever since the
Supreme Court decided Upjohn Co. v. United States3 in 1981. The
possibility of using these privileges moreaggressivelywould seem to be all
the more important in light of the hostile reception given by the courts and
many state legislators to the so-called "self-critical analysis" or "self-
evaluative" privileges 4
In some cases, it would appear that the possibility of asserting these
privileges has not occurred to counsel or to other persons who do work-
place investigations. Some counsel seem to assume that unless they do the
investigation or witness interviews personally, the privileges will not apply.
Sometimes, it is assumed, incorrectly, that communications reporting
"factual information" are not protected by the attorney-client or work-
product privileges.5 In other cases, the assumption seems to be that the
privileges will always be waived anyway for some tactical reason, such as
that the internal investigation will be used as some kind of "affirmative
This Article is an extension and elaboration of comments made at the
conference, and of a summary of ethical considerations in the conduct of internal
investigations presented in WILLIAM FORTUNE, RICHARD UNDERWOOD, & EDWARD
IMWINKELRIED, MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY
HANDBOOK § 5.14 (Supp. 2d ed. 2001). We would like to thank Professor Edward
Brewer, HI, Northern Kentucky University Salmon P.Chase College of Law, for
reviewing an early draft of this Article and providing valuable suggestions.
2 For a recent bit of "Analysis & Perspective" on the subject, see the two part
study at 16 ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF. CON. 329-42, 376-82.
3 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
4 See S. Beville May & Kimberly Cozza, InternalEEO Investigations & Audits:
Are They Privileged?, 629 PLI/LT 313, 334-35, 340-46 (2000); Gregory J.
Wallance & Jay W. Waks, Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing By
Corporate Employees, 1165 PLI/CoRP 507, 522 (2000). For a good collection of
cases and articles on the self-evaluative privilege, see Melissa Tapp, Roberts v.
Hunt: Evaluating the So-Called Self-Evaluative Privilege, 23 AM.J. TRIALADVOC.
471 (1999).
5 This is one of several misconceptions about the attorney-client privilege held
by courts as well as by lawyers. See discussion infra notes 27-42.
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defense," so there is no reason to "go through the motions" necessary to set
up the privileges. Finally, counsel may entertain the assumption that "Open
Records" laws will trump any claims of privilege. The authors would like
to challenge these assumptions, and discuss the practical steps that should
be taken when it has been decided that the privileges are worth claiming.
The authors would also like to address some troubling developments
in the way that employment law is actually being practiced. Recently we
have heard lawyers on the plaintiff's "side of the v." opine that they no
longer need to engage in discovery because they get everything they need
from the employer's investigation. Furthermore, if they do not get the result
they want, they sue, listing a glittering array of state tort claims such as
"negligent investigation," infliction of emotional distress, and tortious
interference.6 Frequently, such elaborate complaints name as additional
defendants anyone participating in the investigation as a witness or as an
investigator. On the defense "side of the v." we hear equally alarming
suggestions that in-house or outside defense counsel may do nothing but sit
back and rely on the results of an internal investigation---"The defense rises
or falls on the strength of the report." We hope to persuade the reader that
these approaches to the practice, on either "side of the v.," are undesirable
and wrongheaded, to say the least.
II. WHAT IS AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION?
An "internal investigation" is "an investigation by an organization of
suspected illegal activity or other misconduct by its officers or employees.
The investigation is usually conducted by an attorney.., who reviews
documents, conducts interviews and prepares a report, either written or
oral, to the organization."7 When an employer hires an outside law firm to
conduct an internal investigation it is frequently called an "independent
investigation."' This terminology is most appropriate when the work is
being done by someone who is not regular outside counsel, the theory being
that the investigator will be more objective9 and not be affected by his or
her prior relationship with the employer or conflict with the complaining
or complained of employee.
6 For a primer for the plaintiffs bar, see Richard A. Bales & Richard 0.
Hamilton, Jr., Workplace Investigations In Kentucky, 27 N. KY. L. REv. 201
(2000).
7 Gary G. Lynch, Internal Investigations, 1085 PLICoRP 369, 373 (1998).
'See, e.g., Wallance & Waks, supra note 4, at 509.
9 Seeid. at 510.
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There are a number of reasons why an organization would want to
conduct an internal investigation. Obviously, it is in the best interests of an
organization to detect and stop illegal or improper conduct. Just as obvious
is the fact that an internal investigation will generate the information and
analysis needed for the organization's defense to anticipated civil and
criminal charges. In some areas of the law an investigation by the employer
may be a prerequisite to the assertion of some sort of special "affirmative
defense."'" In some areas of the law, regulatory authorities may have
imposed an independent obligation on the employer to conduct an internal
investigation of reported wrongdoing." Corporate compliance programs
help assess the cost-benefit of disclosing wrongdoing to the government.'
The Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, whichbecame effective
in 1991, provide for more lenient sentences for corporate offenders which,
10 See infra notes 105-114 and acconpanying text for a discussion of the special
affirmative defense to vicarious liability for sexual harassment recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1998) and Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).
1 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has gone farther
than Faragher and Ellerth, and concluded that the analysis of those cases, and the
employer's duty to investigate, apply to cases involving harassment based on race,
color, religion, or national origin. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1 (2001). Further-
more, the written policies of many educational institutions mandate that the EEO
officer investigate allegations of sexual harassment. See Stephen S. Dunham, Case
Studies of Wrongdoing on Campus: Ethics and the Lawyer's Role, 19 J.C. & U.L.
315, 325-26 (1993). The Sixth Circuit applies Faragher and Ellerth in cases of
alleged racial harassment, Allen v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 165 F.3 d
405, 411 (6th Cir. 1999), and in cases involving alleged religious discrimination,
Hafford v. Seidner, 167 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (6th Cir. 1999). Why not apply
Faragher and Ellerth in cases involving discrimination on the basis of national
origin, Roderiquez v. Kantor, 162 F.3d 1155 (4th Cir. 1998), or age, Breeding v.
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999)? See also Stuart M.
Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in
Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REv. 163 (1999); Gabriel L. Imperato,
Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, Whistleblower Concerns:
Techniques to Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51 ALA. L. REv. 205
(1999); Edward N. Stoner II & Catherine S. Ryan, Burlington, Faragher, Oncale,
and Beyond: Recent Developments in Title VllJurisprudence, 26 J.C. & U.L. 645,
650 (2000) (citing Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581
(5th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated by 169 F.3d 215 (5th
Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated on rehg by 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999), remanded
by 188 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999)); J. Mark Waxman et al., DisclosureRequirements
and Responsibility of Counsel, SE34 ALI-ABA 21 (1999).
12 See generally Lynch, supra note 7, at 375.
[VOL. 90
UNIVERSITY INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
at the time of the offense, had implemented an "effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law."' 3 Finally, the efforts of a corporation
or entity to clean up such problems on its own may be good business and
good public relations. 4 This maybe a particularly important consideration
for an academic institution, because faculty and students would presumably
prefer, indeed insist, that their institution follow a policy of open and
aggressive correction of wrongdoing and improper conduct, such as racial
discrimination and sexual harassment.
III. WHAT DID UPJOHN SAY ABOUT INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS?
In 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of
Upjohn Co. v. United States.' In this case the Court provided much needed
clarification of the scope of the corporate attorney-cli ent privilege under
federal evidence law. The case arose out of an internal investigation of
suspected "questionable" and "possibly illegal" payments by one of
Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries to foreign government officials in order to
secure foreign government business 6 (such payments are a problem under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). The Chairman of Upjohn requested the
company's general counsel to conduct an investigation with the aid of
outside counsel. As part of the investigation, the Chairman issued a letter
to "All Foreign General and Area Managers" instructing them to provide
detailed information concerning such "questionable payments" to general
counsel (by completing a confidential questionnaire). 7 The managers were
instructed to treat all such information as highly confidential and not to
discuss the investigation with anyone other than Upjohn employees who
might be of assistance in providing the necessary information. Counsel also
interviewed the managers who provided questionnaires, and interviewed
thirty-three other Upjohn employees or officers. Later, when Upjohn
submitted required reports to the SEC and the IRS disclosing "questionable
payments," the IRS issued a summons demanding all of the question-
naires. ' The company declined to produce the materials on the ground that
13 See Gregory J. Wallance, Corporate Compliance Programs Under The
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 1165 PLI/CoRp 9, 11 (2000).
14 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox
of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1382-92 (1999).
15 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
161d. at 386-87.
17 Id.
'8Id. at 387-88.
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they were communications to counsel within the attorney-client privilege. 9
The lower court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that the
materials sought were not within the privilege because they were not
communications from person's within a "control group"--persons
sufficiently high up in the corporate chain to be deemed the "client."'2
However, the Supreme Court rejected this "control group" test, opining that
an employee's status in the corporate hierarchy does not determine whether
a communication is privileged, noting that:
Middle-level--end indeed lower-level--employees can, by actions within
the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal
difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the
relevant information needed by corporate counsel if [counsel] is ade-
quately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential
difficulties.
21
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to
counselfor Upjohn [or representatives of counsel] acting as such, at the
direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from
counsel .... Information, not available fromupper-echelonmanagement,
was needed to supply abasisfor legaladvice concerning compliance with
... laws. ... regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation
in each [of the relevant] areas. The communications concerned matters
within the scope of the employees'corporate duties, and the employees
themselves were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in
order that the corporation could obtain legal advice.... Pursuant to
explicit instructions from the Chairman of the Board, the communications
were considered "highly confidential" when made... and have been kept
confidential by the company. Consistent with the underlying purposes of
the attorney-client privilege, these communications must be protected
against compelled disclosure.2
It is important to note all of the preconditions mentioned in this pas-
sage-(1) communication to counsel or counsel's representative, (2) from
a corporate employee, (3) concerning a matter within the scope of his or her
employment and involving information that is presumably not available
'9 Id. at 388.
2 Id. at 388-89.
21Id. at 391.
22 Id. at 394-95 (emphasis added).
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from upper management, (4) made at the direction of the employee's
corporate superiors so that the corporation can get legal advice, (5) the
employee is aware of the purpose and the need for confidentiality, and (6)
the communication is confidential when made and kept confidential. Of
course, if any of these prerequisites is not satisfied, there is some risk that
a claim of privilege will fail.23
It is now well established that the privilege applies to materials
generated by employees acting at the request of in-house counsel as well as
outside counsel, although ambiguities regarding the role that in-house
counsel played in particular scenarios has allowed for some rather stingy
judicial interpretations of the privilege from time to time. In 1997, the ABA
House of Delegates passed a resolution of support for the common
understanding that "the attorney-client privilege for communications
between in-house counsel and their clients should have the same scope and
effect as the attorney-client privilege for communications between outside
counsel and their clients."24 The hope was that this might clear up the
judicial confusion,25 and shore up the privilege against "erosion." '26
IV. WHAT EXACTLY IS PROTECTED?
The authors looked for state and federal cases interpreting Upjohn and
discovered that there is a lot of confusion as to what, exactly, is covered by
these privileges. Indeed, there is so much confusion that Professor Paul
Rice of American University was able to generate a substantial law review
article discussing persistent misconceptions about the attorney-client
privilege.2" The most important point he makes in his excellent article is
23 Wallance & Waks, supra note 4, at 516.
24 See Carole Basri, Confidentiality of Communications, 1165 PLI/CORP 481,
488-89 (2000) (citing Recommendation to ABA House of Delegates (Aug. 1997)).
25 See Amber Stevens, Comment, An Analysis of the Troubling Issues Sur-
rounding In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 HAMLINE L.
REV. 289 (1999) (analyzing the uncertainty and ambiguity resulting from courts'
disparate treatment of the issue).
26 See Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding
Confidentiality In Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1999); David
M. Zomow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death
of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147
(2000).
27 See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About
Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source ofthe
Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 967 (1999).
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that many courts have been persuaded, wrongly, that "a client's [or a client
employee's] communication of non-confidential information precludes the
communication [incorporating that information] from being confidential."'
As we have seen in our discussion of Upjohn, communications to corporate
counsel or his or her representatives made in order for the corporation to
obtain legal advice are privileged, regardless of the nature or source of the
facts and information included. While it is true that the facts are not
protected, in the sense that opposing counsel can ask witnesses about those
facts either in his or her own discovery or investigation (facts do not
become "off-limits" just because they were reported to counsel), opposing
counsel must do his or her own work.29 Corporate counsel does not have to
turn over materials generated for counsel's use in giving legal advice
merely because the information is "factual." In short, the privilege may not
protect facts from independent discovery, but the privilege does protect
communications of facts. Upjohn said so clearly:
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not
to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is
an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the
question, "What did you say or write to the attorney?" but may not refuse
to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he
incorporated a statement of such fact into his communications to his
attorney.
30
To say the same thing another way, ifa plaintiff seeks a communication
of facts, written or oral, between a corporation's employee and the
corporation's attorney (or a representative of that attorney), made to help
counsel provide legal services to the corporate client, then the plaintiff is
not seeking the facts themselves, but rather is intruding into matters that are
privileged.3' In short, witness statements of fact to counsel and counsel
21 Id. at 983.
29 "While it would probably be more convenient for the Government to secure
the results of petitioner's internal investigation by simply subpoenaing the
questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner's attorneys, such considerations of
convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege."
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
30 Id. at 395-96 (citing Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp.
830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
31 For recent state court decisions getting it right, see Gordon v. Newspaper
Association ofAmerica, No. LF-768-3, 2000 WL 14693 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5,2000),
modified in other respects at 2000 WL 140602 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 2000) and
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notes about factual matters generated during internal investigations of
alleged corporate crime, health care fraud and abuse, malpractice,
environmental crimes and torts, and Title VII discrimination, and sexual
harassment,32 can fall within the attorney-client privilege as well as the
work product privilege.33 The plaintiff may, through his or her own
investigation and discovery (his or her own work), inquire into the facts
known by a witness, but may not have the fruits of opposing counsel's
inquiry in the absence of some kind of waiver.34
Furthermore, it is important to note that witness statements that are
"factual" are also covered by the work product rule.35 Indeed, the Supreme
Court ruled in Upjohn that the materials in question were also protected by
the work product privilege.36 Some lawyers and judges appear to operate on
Gould v. City of Aliquippa, 750 A.2d 934 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). For a state
supreme court that seems to have gotten it wrong, see In re Texas Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 12 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2000) (strong opinion dissenting from
the Texas high court's denial of a petition for mandamus which had sought the
reversal of a bizarre ruling of an appellate court to the effect that the privilege does
not apply to communications of facts between attorney and client). For other cases
that were wrongly decided, see Rice, supra note 27.
32 See Glenn A. Duhl, Conducting Sexual Harassment Investigations (With
Sample Procedures), 10 No. 6 PRAC. LITIGATOR 11, 15-18 (1999) (providing
sample procedures for sexual harassment investigations that should preserve the
attorney-client and work product privileges).
33 See Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
discussed infra note 130 and accompanying text.
34See Gould, 750 A.2d at 938.
3 SeegenerallyCHARLsW.WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGALETHICS 292-96 (1986).
The work product privilege extends to interviews of former employees and non-
employee witnesses. Wallance & Waks, supra note 4, at 519.36 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981). Work product
protection would extend to materials, such as witness statements of fact to counsel
or counsel notes, obtained in interviews from former employees as well as present
employees-indeed to materials generated fromnon-client sources. See WOLFRAM,
supra note 35, at 296. This may make the work product privilege very important
in states which limit the Upjohn attorney-client privilege to communications from
present employees. However, it also should be noted that there are many federal
cases extending the rationale of Upjohn to include information obtained from
former employees as within the attorney-client privilege. See generally CHRIsTO-
PHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 389-90 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing Upjohn's application to former employees); John F. Savarese & Carol
Miller, ProtectingPrivilege andDealingFairly With Employees While Conducting
an Internal Investigation, 1121 PLI/CORP 525 (1999).
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the belief that only the opinions or mental impressions of a lawyer are
protected by the work product privilege, but this is certainly not the case.37
While it is true that opinions and mental impressions are entitled to a higher
level of protection than "factual" material, perhaps even absolute protec-
tion,38 other work product is discoverable only upon a showing of
substantial need and that the party seeking such material is unable, without
undue hardship, to obtain their substantial equivalent. 9 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court in Upjohn ruled that counsel notes and memoranda of
witnesses' oral statements should rarely be produced because they
necessarily tend to reveal counsel's mental impressions.40 An often
overlooked ruling in the opinion was that the magistrate in the lower court
had erred in applying the Rule 26 "substantial need" and "undue hardship"
standard.4 Instead, counsel notes and memoranda of witness's oral
statements are "deserving [of] special [higher] protection."42 Absent
waiver, such materials are not the plaintiffs simply for the asking, or
simply because discovery of them would save the plaintifftime and money.
Finally, while it is true that work product protection is available only
for materials prepared in "anticipation of litigation," '43 the Second Circuit
held that a document is prepared "in anticipation of litigation" and is work
product if it was prepared "because of' existing or expected litigation; it
need not have been prepared "primarily to assist in" the litigation.'
Professor Edward Brewer, see supra note 1, also advises that the workproduct
privilege is particularly important in states that reject Upjohn and limit the attorney-
client privilege to the "control group." Professor Brewer also recommends that in
such states the control group should be interviewed first.
37See Wallance & Waks, supra note 4, at 519.
38See WOLFRAM, supra note 35, at 293.39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(3).
40 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399-401.
41Id. at 401.
421d. at 400. What if counsel uses a stock list of questions as a sort of standing
operating procedure? Could opposing counsel contend that the questions and
answers do not reflect counsel's mental impressions? It seems unlikely that anyone
would proceed in such a mechanical and unimaginative way, but presumably
counsel would ask follow up questions that would reflect impressions and
conclusions. Would opposing counsel have more luck if a non-lawyer were using
counsel's stock questions?
431 d. at 400-01.
44 United States v. Aldman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197-1203 (2d Cir. 1998). "It is
often prior to the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped either
to help clients avoid litigation or to strengthen available defenses should litigation
occur." Savarese & Miller, supra note 36, at 543. So the lack of a specific claim
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Statements and other material generated in an investigation should be
protected if they were generated to advise an employer about potential
liability or to assist counsel in making recommendations about improved
compliance, as well as to assist counsel in defending an anticipated claim.
V. WHAT KIND OF GROUNDWORK IS INVOLVED IF THE
PRIVILEGE IS TO BE PRESERVED? WHAT ARE THE MEcHANIcs?
The language of Upjohn, set out above, provides us with a checklist to
follow during an investigation.45
(1) There should be a directive from higher authority authorizing an
investigation. For example, in corporate investigations there maybe a board
resolution or at least a letter from the CEO to the general counsel authoriz-
ing the investigation 6 Although it is unclear whether a standing order from
a university president or chancellor to general counsel, setting forth
procedures to be followed in certain types of cases, such as claims of sexual
harassment or other discrimination, would also suffice, it is our opinion that
it would.
(2) The purpose of the investigation should be documented in the file.
For example, it should be made clear that more than a fact investigation is
being conducted. It should be stated that the purpose of the investigation is
to obtain information for counsel so that he or she can advise the employer
regarding potential liability, and to defend in any potential or anticipated
litigation, and to make recommendations for improved compliance in the
future. The directive should allude to all possible litigation. These recitals
will support a claim that the material generated in the investigation was
generated "in anticipation of litigation" for purposes of the work product
doctrine. However, if counsel is sending pre-interview letters to employees
(particularly letters to "non-control group" employees in states that do not
should not preclude the availability of the work product privilege. See id.
" The checklist that follows is suggested by Waxman et al., supra note 11, at
35-40. See also Peter M. Panken & Barbara Ann Sellinger, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, SE42 ALI-ABA 519 (1999) for a
particularly useful set of guidelines ("twelve rules to follow in conducting an
internal investigation," plus useful form letters including a "request for authoriza-
tion to conduct an internal investigation," a letter from management or "authoriza-
tion for an internal investigation," and a"memorandumto employees advising them
of the investigation").
4 For a collection of form letters that might be used at various stages of an
internal investigation, see Edward C. Brewer III, The Ethics oflnternallnvestiga-
tions in Kentucky and Ohio, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 721, 806-39 (2000).
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
follow Upjohn), one may wish to be exercise some caution in explaining
the nature and scope of potential litigation in such letters.
(3) Organize the investigation with a view to protecting the attorney-
client and work product privileges by:
(a) Marking all communications as "Attorney-Client Privileged" and
"Work Product."
(b) Beginning all employee interviews with "Upjohn warnings" so that
the interviewee understands that counsel or counsel's representative
represents the employer corporation (or University) and not the employee;
that the interview is being done to help counsel provide legal advice to the
employer corporation (or University); that the information will initially be
treated as confidential, but that any privilege belongs to the employer
corporation (or University) and may be waived by the employer; that the
interviewee should not discuss the interview or discussions with anyone;47
and that the interviewee may want to have his or her own counsel in
appropriate cases.48 The authors suggest putting these warnings right at the
top of any outline prepared for use during the interview. This serves as a
reminder to give the warnings, and also serves to document the fact that the
warnings were given. When a witness statement is taken, or when a
' There are practical and ethical limits on counsel's ability to control an
employee's ability to interview or discuss the information with anyone. Aside from
the legal question of the extent to which the employer can demand cooperation
from its employees, there is also the ethical dimension alluded to in Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.4(f), which provides:
A lawyer shall not ... request a person other than a client to refrain from
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless: the person
is... an employee or other agent of a client; and (2) the lawyer reasonably
believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by
refraining from giving such information.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983). Also, if the employee is
separately represented, the employer's counsel must not bypass the employee's
lawyer. See Jeffrey D. Wohl, Ethical Obligations of Employment Lawyers, 615
PLIILrr 1033, 1051-58, 1064-65 (1999) (discussing Model Rule 4.2, as well as the
problem ofjoint representation).
48 For the text of recommended "Upjohn Warnings," see Waxman et al., supra
note 11, at 37-39. See also Savarese & Miller, supra note 36, at 555-56 (including
model warnings to employees); Wallance & Waks, supra note 4, at 511. The D.C.
Bar's Legal Ethics Committee has issued a useful ethics opinion, Opinion No. 269,
setting forth the ethical "Obligation of [a] Lawyer for [a] Corporation to Clarify
[the Lawyer's] Role in [an] Internal Corporate Investigation." It is included as an
appendix to Waxman etal., supranote 11, at46-56. Professor Brewer suggests that
these setup points may be covered in an introductory letter from counsel.
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verbatim record is made before a court reporter, we like to put the warnings
at the top of the statement or recite the warnings at the beginning of the
transcript. We also document the fact that the interview or statement is in
"anticipation of litigation."
(c) Documenting the interviews. Many witness's are uncomfortable
about tape recording49 and in some jurisdictions the work product status
of recordings may be in question. 0 Secret tape recording is generally
ethically inappropriate, even in states where it is legal." Unless there is
some need to pin a witness down or to perpetuate the witness's testi-
mony, the substance of the interviews will usually consist of counsel's
(or counsel's representative's) notes' as opposed to signed witness
statements or transcripts under oath. Many counsel recommend that
verbatim transcripts be avoided, and that counsel weave in his or her men-
tal impressions regarding the credibility of the interviewee and the like.
53
49 See Lynch, supra note 7, at 386.
s0 See Waxman et aL, supra note 11, at 40.
51 See FORTUNE FT AL., supra note 1, § 5.8. However, state bar opinions may
change in the wake of ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 01-422 (2001), which allows
secret recording and reverses ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 337 (1974), which
prohibited the practice with a possible exception for law enforcement officials. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001). This
new opinion represents a startling reversal of policy.52 In the past, some counsel have argued against taking notes, for fear that they
might be discoverable. However, the authors feel that an investigation will not have
much credibility ifit can not be supported bynotes. Furthermore, there will usually
be more than one investigator in the course of an investigation. The need for
communication between investigators and between investigators and counsel,
coupled with the problem of fading memories over time, suggest that the taking of
detailed notes is advisable. On the need for "a written report that thoroughly and
fairly summarizes the factual findings and the bases for them," but "in a way that
avoids making unnecessary 'admissions' that can later be mischaracterized in the
course of any litigation," see Stoner & Ryan, supra note 11, at 662.
5 See, e.g., Waxman et al., supra note 11, at 40. On reflection, the authors do
not think that this is necessary in light of the language of the Supreme Court in
Upjohn. See discussion supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text Professor
Brewer says that he does not like the idea of weaving attorney comments into
materials (and obviously would not do this in audio or video tape, where it would
break up the interview and perhaps reveal things to the interviewee that should not
be revealed) since, if the case is being litigated in a state court, under case law that
is hostile to the privileges' and if the court orders a turnover, the lawyer will be put
to the expense and trouble of redacting such materials to protect opinion work
product. See supra note 1. We would also point out the following considerations:
The observations and insights of investigating counsel (regarding witness
2001-20021
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Presumably, the thought is that this will strengthen any claim of work
product. 4
(d) Limiting access to the investigative reports and materials on a strict
need to know basis.5"
VI. DOES UPJOHN APPLY TO A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY?
When deciding if Upjohn applies to public universities, the only safe
answer is "maybe, and maybe not." After all, the Upjohn Court was not
dealing with a public entity, and was looking at a question of federal
evidence law. In order to answer this question in a particular jurisdiction,
one must examine not only federal law, but also state evidence law in the
particular state.
Many federal courts have held that the Upjohn criteria apply to
governmental entities as well as to private corporations.5 6 Cases involving
public universities are hard to find, but they are out there." One of the best
illustrative cases actually involves Cornell, which is New York's land grant
institution, but which is also a private Ivy-League institution." Let's start
credibility or posible leads for further investigation) would ordinarily be very
valuable to outside or trial counsel who should use and build upon the investigation
and underlying work product. Unfortunately, the employer, and even trial counsel,
seldom take the time to read all of the underlying material. Furthermore, if it is
ruled later that material is discoverable, there may never be any serious effort at
redaction.
4 See generally Lynch, supra note 7, at 386 (describing the mechanics of the
interview). Usually verbatim transcripts are not made. The assumption apparently
being that the verbatim transcript will be less likely to be protected, since some
courts believe mistakenly that communications of fact are not covered by the
various privileges. See id.
5 See Basri, supra note 24, at 493; Wallance & Waks, supra note 4, at 518; see
also Stoner & Ryan, supra note 11, at 652 n.45, 662 ("milt is advisable [but perhaps
not necessary] to report the results of any investigation to the complaining
employee'... but "unnecessary or improper disclosure may create a claim for
defamation.").
56 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, at 396.
"' For a recent unpublished opinion, see Hite v. University of Montana, No.
DV-98-86824 (Mont. 4th Jud. Dist. Ct., Missoula County Apr. 14,2000) (citing
NATIONALASSOCATION OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSrryATrORNEYS, UNDERTAND-
ING ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ISSUES IN THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
SETTING).
" See Cornell Facts, at http://www.info.comeli.edu/CUFACTS/sidebar.htm
(last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
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with it, and then see where it leads. The case is Carter v. Cornell Univer-
sity.
59
This case was brought by an African-American female who was
employed as an administrative secretary at Cornell. She alleged that she had
been passed over for promotion in favor of a less qualified white male,
Phillips. To make matters worse, Phillips became her supervisor, and Carter
alleged that Phillips began to harass and intimidate her, and that his
conduct was rooted in racial animus. She also alleged that she was
reprimanded in retaliation for her filing a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC.6°
At some point in the litigation, Carter's counsel decided to depose a
Ms. Patricia Flamm, who was the Associate Dean of Human Resources at
the Cornell University Medical College. Ms. Flamm had been directed by
defendant's counsel to conduct interviews of college employees for the
exclusive use of counsel in rendering legal advice to Cornell concerning
Carter's complaints of discrimination.6' During the deposition, defense
59 Carterv. Cornell Univ., 173 F.R.D. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aftd, 159 F.3d 1345
(Table) (2d Cir. 1998) (In its unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit explicitly
agreed with the trial judge's ruling on attorney-client privilege.). The case also was
cited favorably in a case involving a hospital internal investigation of a claim filed
on behalf of an eleven year old African-American girl who claimed that she had
been forced by police and hospital personnel to undergo a gynecological exam
without her or her mother's consent Armstrong v. Brookdale Hosp., No. 98 CV
2416(SJ), 1999 WL 690149 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The investigation had been
conducted by a nurse investigator working for a law firm that had been employed
by the hospital's insurer. Id. at * 1. This case will no doubt be of interest to lawyers
advising academic medical centers.
60 Carter, 173 F.R.D. at 93.
61 Id. See also id. at 94, 95 n.3, where the court makes the following observa-
tion:
Of course, Ms. Flamm, as Associate Dean of Human Resources, does not
generally function as counsel's agent and any information which she
obtains in connection with her position as Associate Dean is discoverable.
However, when, as here, she is told specifically by counsel to conduct an
investigation whose sole purpose is to assist counsel in rendering legal
representation and she undertakes such an investigation, she becomes
counsel's agent for the purpose of that investigation.
Some University EEO officers are practicing lawyers, but some are not In any
event, to safeguard the privileges, counsel should make it clear either in the specific
case or by some kind of standing order or directive, that the EEO investigator is
conducting the interview or investigation to assist counsel in rendering legal advice.
As Professor Robert Lawson noted when reviewing this article, lawyers and judges
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counsel objected to certain questions and requests for documents and
information on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and work product.62
The court upheld the claims of privilege citing Upjohn. The court reasoned
as follows.
The employees in this case were interviewed for the exclusive purpose of
obtaining legal advice for the client, and the results of those interviews
were passed along in written form to defendant's counsel. If such
information could be cavalierly disclosed, the company which would
decide to conduct a thorough internal investigation in order to prepare for
trial would be a rare one indeed. It is precisely because such investiga-
tions are vital to effective trial preparation that the Supreme Court has
protected this type of information under the attorney-client privilege.
63
Furthermore, the work product rule clearly protected other information
generated by Ms. Flamm's investigation from disclosure, insofar as Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) shielded it as material prepared in
anticipation of litigation by a party or a party's representative unless the
opposing party could demonstrate a substantial need for the material and
an inability to obtain it by other means. Here, Ms. Flamm was a "party's
representative" who was counsel's agent. The plaintiff's counsel could
have done his or her own work and deposed the Cornell employees. So the
work product rule also protected the information from disclosure.'
In Kentucky, where the authors teach and practice, the attorney-client
privilege is governed by Kentucky Rule of Evidence ("K.R.E.") 503.
K.R.E. 503(a) defines "[c]lient" as "a person, including... [an] entity,
either public or private., 65 Furthermore, one of the most influential
members of the K.R.E. Study Committee that drafted and recommended the
adoption of the rules takes the position that the K.R.E. "clearly intended to
employ [the] fundamentals [set out in Upjohn] as the framework for the
lawyer-client privilege in the corporate context."" Indeed, the Study
ordinarily think of a lawyer's "representative" as someone necessary for the
rendition of legal services like a law clerk, secretary, paralegal, or investigator.62Id. at 93.
631Id. at 95.
64Id. at 95-96.
6 KY. R. EVID. [hereinafter K.R.E.] 503(a).
66 ROBERTG. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAWHANDBOOK 246 (3d ed.
1993). This is accepted (grudgingly?) in Richard A. Bales & Richard 0. Hamilton,
Jr., Workplace Investigations in Kentucky, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 201,274-77 (2000).
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Committee Notes so state.67 K.R.E. 503(b)(1) provides a privilege for
communications "[bletween ... a representative of the client and the
client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer."' K.R.E. 503(a)(4)
defines "[r]epresentative of the lawyer" as "a person employed by the
lawyer to assist the lawyer in rendering professional legal services."69
K.R.E. 503(a)(2)(B) defines "[r]epresentative of the client' to include
"[a]ny employee.., of the client who makes or receives a confidential
communication: (i) In the course and scope of his or her employment; (ii)
Concerning the subject matter of his or her employment; and (iii) To
effectuate legal representation for the client."7 All of this language does
indeed parallel Upjohn, and plugs in nicely to the Cornell case.7
VII. WHY WOULD You WANT TO ASSERT THESE PRIVILEGES?
Before proceeding, we would again like to make the point that an
institution, or at least some constituents in an institution, may be troubled
by investigations that are less than wide-open to public scrutiny. If such
openness is a matter of institutional policy, then so be it. On the other hand,
67 See Study Committee Notes, Commentary to Subdivision (a)(2), reprinted in
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & GLEN WEISSENBERGER, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE: 2001
COURTROOM MANUAL 548-49 (2000). Unfortunately, the Study Committee Notes
maybe unnecessarily grudging insofar as they suggest that the statements of former
employees are not covered. See LAWSON, supra note 66, at 247. Federal cases
interpreting Upjohn sensibly extend the protection of the privilege of Upjohn to
communications with former employees as needed for the rendering of legal
services, at least insofar as the communications relate to the subject matter of the
former employment See cases collected in LAWSON, supra note 66, at 247 n.1 16;
WOLFRAM, supra note 35, at 285. But see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
36, at 387-88. Of course, witness statements and the like taken from former
employees would still be covered by the work product privilege in both state and
federal court. See UNDERWOOD & WEISSENBERGER, supra, at 170.6 K.R.E. 503(b)(1) (emphasis added).
691 Id. at 503(a)(4) (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 503(aX2)(B) (emphasis added).
71 Compare Monica L. Goebel & John B. Nickerson, Prompt RemedialAction
and Waiver ofPrivilege, 35 ARiz. ATr'Y 24, 28 (1999), which states:
Varying actions and levels of attorney involvement may be utilized in order
to bring the investigation within the protections of the privilege.... [T]he
attorney's role could range from personally conducting all aspects of the
investigation to merely guiding the human resources personnel on actions
to be taken as the investigation proceeds.
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any such policy should have been arrived at only after thorough consider-
ation of the consequences, not just to the institution and its constituents, but
to the individuals involved in or impacted by the investigation. Further-
more, any such policy should be explainable and explained. University
presidents and chancellors may have a fiduciary obligation, defeasible only
by the Board of Regents or Trustees, to protect information subject to the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, even as against the
position or resolutions of a Faculty Senate or other body. In any event, we
are lawyers, and so we must be predisposed to protecting all privileges.
Also, in addition to the mandate of professional ethics, there are many
practical reasons for protecting all privileges, at least at the outset. 72
First and foremost, confidentiality, to the extent that it can be main-
tained, encourages participation. Consider the views of one commentator
who was recalling the good old days before government imposed
"corporate compliance:"
The attorney typically advises the employee that, though the
corporation may waive privilege at some point in the future, it has no
present intention to do so. The attorney may tell the employee that the
investigation is being conducted to allow the corporation to determine
what happened and how best to proceed. In the vast majority of cases,
while the employee may feel he must cooperate with the employer's
inquiry, the employee will take some comfort in counsel's representation
' The authors admit that they may seem a bit schizophrenic on this issue. One
author is a former defense lawyer who thinks in terms of protecting the institution,
although that is hardly inconsistent with rooting out wrongdoing. The other author
is an EEO officer. In the EEO officer's view, the EEO officer's duty is to
investigate to assure compliance and to insure that students and employees are
protected. At the same time, the EEO officer does not represent the complainant,
or report to the complainant any more than is necessary to responsibly resolve the
complaint. The EEO officer should not assume the role of advocate for the
complainant or the accused, and should not assume the role of an adversary of the
institution. It is the EEO officer's responsibility to be objective and fulfill his or her
obligation to assure that the institution complies with the applicable law and its
own policies. At the same time, the results of the EEO officer's investigation are
going to be relied upon by the institution's legal counsel in giving legal advice to
the institution. Throughout this Article, it is our assumption that conducting the
investigation in such a way as to preserve evidentiary privileges is consistent with
these duties. The desirability of waiver in a particular case is a matter to be
considered by the institutional client following advice by in-house or outside legal
counsel.
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that the company has not yet decided to disclose to the government
information learned from the employee. Historically, because it was not
a foregone conclusion that the employee's statements would be delivered
to the government-indeed, such a disclosure would have been
unusual-the investigative process would typically remain a private
inquiry among a corporate employer, its counsel, and its employees.
73
In other words, investigations conducted in the sunshine are not likely to
get anywhere. Investigations are disruptive. Bad relationships can be made
worse-worse still with unnecessary disclosures of who said what to
whom. Also, there is the matter of bad publicity.
74
Secondly, one assumes that the institution will want to solve the
"problem" without subjecting itself to unnecessary embarrassment or
liability. There may be no liability; and even if there is exposure, the
responsible officials within the institution have the right and duty tominimize the institution's exposure. In an adversary system the institution
has every right to make the plaintiff do his or her own work, and meet his
or her burden of proof on the relevant issues. 5 "[G]ood faith investigations
often result in paper trails for external, hostile parties to follow. 716 Even in
cases where the investigator finds no liability, the report of the investiga-
tion, and the investigatory materials, will provide plaintiff's counsel with
a road map. By waiving any possible privilege and turning over the report
of investigation and supporting materials:
The employer gives the plaintiff] a firsthand look at how the attorney
viewed the case based on the witnesses that were interviewed, the order
73Zomow & Krakur, supra note 26, at 153.
74Lynch, supra note 7, at 401-02 (discussing risks of negative publicity and the
disruptive effect an inquiry can have on on-going relations with insiders and
outside individuals and organizations).
Employees are often hesitant to bring complaints to the EEO officer because
they fear that their complaints will be the subject of talk in the community, or the
stuff of a news story. Of course, confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, and the
privilege is the institution's to waive; but to the extent that confidentiality can be
maintained during the investigation, complainants are likely to be more forthcom-
ing. Many complaints will be resolved satisfactorily without litigation.
' But for the attitude of the plaintiff's bar, see supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
76 Kevin Mark Smith, Preventing Discovery of Internal Investigation Mater-
ials: Protecting Oneself From One's Own Petard, 69 J. KAN. B.A. 28, 28 (2000).
7 See Joseph T. McLaughlin & J. Kevin McCarthy, CorporateInternalInvesti-
gations-Legal Privileges and Ethical Issues in the Employment Law Context,
SD06 ALI-ABA 991,993 (1998); Savarese & Miller, supra note 36, at 530, 534.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
in which those witnesses were interviewed, the type and nature of the
questions asked of those witnesses and any notes taken by the attorney for
those witnesses. This would certainly provide the plaintiff with an
advantage in litigation.78
In other words, even in cases in which there is no apparent liability, the
institution may not want to turn over a report or other investigatory
materials to plaintiff's counsel. Even a strong report will probably not make
the plaintiff go away. Seemingly good facts can be twisted or taken out of
context. Admissions or seemingly bad facts about the alleged harasser or
others that seem unimportant can come backto bite.79 Furthermore, "[w]ith
the benefit of hindsight, parties in subsequent civil or criminal actions may
look for any inaccuracies in the report, however minor or insignificant to
support an argument that the report was an attempt to hide or downplay
misconduct.""0
There is also a whole range of investigative outcomes besides "no
liability" and "lost cause." An investigation may not be completed because
of uncooperative witnesses, an uncooperative complainant, or too little time
or resources. An investigation may not have been undertaken or may have
been abandoned because it was simply too late to remediate. An investiga-
tion may be completed, but the situation may remain ambiguous. Finally,
there are limits on any investigation. The investigator will not have the
benefit of the discovery rules or the subpoena power, or the ability to
secure information under oath and during cross-examination. The
investigator may not explore certain avenues for fear of disruption of the
institution's business, or the fear of spreading information outside the
organization. Again, outside counsel who is hired to defend subsequent
litigation must understand the limits of even the best investigation, and
cannot simply rely upon the report.
Finally, there is the possibility of tort liability to the complainant, the
alleged harasser, witnesses and others, which relates back to the problem
78 Judith E. Harris, Sexual Harassment Investigations, SE17 ALI-ABA 53, 65
(1999).79 See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Lawyers as Investigators: How Ellerth and
Faragher Reveal a Crisis of Ethics and Professionalism Through Trial Counsel
Disqualification and Waivers ofPrivilege in Workplace Harassment Cases, 24 J.
LEGAL PROF. 261, 310 (2000) (the report or other work product may reveal the
"dirty details" of an investigation, such as compromises made to ease the harasser
out, blunt assessments of the accuser, the accused, and other witnesses, other
information unearthed about the players, and so on).80Lynch, supra note 7, at 404.
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of securing cooperation. Witnesses do not want to get tied up in litigation
or be harassed.
Most counsel are aware of the qualified privileges that can be used as
defenses to these suits."1 However, many employment lawyers take very
little comfort from the existence of these qualified privileges since the
plaintiff will invariably allege the existence of "malice."'82 In some cases,
but certainly not all cases, 3 there is some risk that the issue will have to go
8 See Peter M. Panken et al., Creating a Harassment-Free Workplace, SE42
ALI-ABA 1125, 1137-38 (1999).82 See, e.g., Arnold H. Pedowitz, What Goes Around Comes Around, the Legal
Implications Arising From Sexual Harassment Investigations, a Plaintiff's View,
N98SHCB ABA-LGLED D-59, n.3 (ABA Ctr. for CLE 1998). In addition to the
threat of lawsuits for traditional torts such as libel and slander and infliction of
emotional distress, a worrying number of new theories are being advanced by
lawyers representing male employees disciplined or investigated for sexual
harassment. See Ernest F. Lidge I, The Male Employee Disciplined For Sexual
Harassment as SexDiscriminationPlaintiff, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 717 (2000). One
of the more distressing developments is the suggestion by the Federal Trade
Commission ('FTC") that "'outside organizations [law firms] utilized by
employers to assist in their investigations of harassment claims' may be consumer
reporting agencies" whose investigative reports, called "investigative consumer
reports," would be subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Michael Delikat,
Sexual Harassment Update, 656 PLI/Lrr 373,491-92 (2001). The implications of
this would be that written authorization of the alleged harasser might have to be
obtained before an investigation could be conducted, which would mean that in
many cases the employer could not comply with the requirements of other federal
law that the employer take prompt and effective remedial action. Furthermore, the
alleged harasser would have to be able to obtain a copy of the report, and would
have a right to dispute the accuracy and completeness of the report in the event of
adverse action. See id. at 491-96; Van Detta, supra note 79, at 321-22. Employees
will be less likely to participate in investigations under such a regime, and
employers may be tempted to keep sexual harassment investigation in-house, but
then face claims that its investigations are biased or ineffective due to the limited
resources ofin-house investigators and delay associated with overload. See Kim S.
Ruark, Note, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't? Employers' Challenges
in Conducting Sexual Harassment Investigations, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 575, 602-
03 (2000). For a recent case rejecting the FTC's position, see Hartman v. Lisle
Park District, 158 F. Supp. 2d 869, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
a For cases in Kentucky's jurisdiction in which the privilege has been applied
as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment or a motion for a directed
verdict see Smith v. Westlake PVC Corp., No. 96-6550, 1997 WL 764489 (6th Cir.
Dec. 3, 1997); Hughes v. DHL Worldwide Express, No. 94-3185, 1995 WL
399072 (6th Cir. July 6, 1995); Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 WL
2001-2002]
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to the jury, which is always a dangerous proposition.' Some firms are now
demanding that their corporate clients agree to indemnify them, or add
investigating counsel to the corporation's D&O policy, since retaliatory
lawsuits are "becoming more popular." 5
Although the case law is limited, the authors would argue that absolute
privileges should also be asserted. One is the so-called "litigation privi-
lege," which provides an absolute privilege for witnesses and counsel for
communications preliminary to a reasonably anticipated proceeding. 6
While the privilege is usually claimed by a party, a witness, or a lawyer
who later served as trial counsel, there is no reason not to extend it to
20305 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1992); Landrum v. Braun, 978 S.W.2d 756 (Ky. Ct. App.
1998) (claims dismissed on motion before trial); Wyantv. SCM Corp,, 692 S.W.2d
814, 816 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (internal report not "published," and qualified
privilege applied on directed verdict motion).
14 See Ellen M. Martin et al., Workplace Claims: Wrongful Termination, Col-
lateral Torts, Privacy, Restrictions on Right to Compete, Reference Checks, and
Investigations, 614 PLIILrr 511, 555-57 (1999). For an interesting case see Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane, 31 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (confused [?] jury
awarded discharged alleged harasser $2.3 million actual and $800,000 punitive
damages; verdict reversed on appeal and plaintiff given a take nothing judgment
because of absence ofmalice; appellate court also rejected a negligent investigation
claim as a matter of law).
5 Waxman et al., supra note 11, at 36. Professor Brewer, see supra note 1,
called our attention to a recent Pennsylvania trial court decision in which a male
employee was awarded $150,000 against an employer and a female employee who
accused the male employee of rape, where it was determined that the two were
engaged in a consensual relationship. See Shannon P. Duffy, Employee Awarded
$150,000 After Co-Worker Falsely Acc uses Him ofRape, THE LEGAL INTELLIGEN-
CER, Oct. 24, 2001, at http://www.law.com (discussing the case of Jackson v.
McCrory in Philadelphia). The award was later thrown out by the trial judge, who
noted, among other things, that the employer's investigation (which the jury took
to be an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy) was mandated by federal law. See Lori
Litchman, Judge Throws Out Jury Award in Worker Privacy Case, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 16, 2002, at http://www.lawcom.
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 57 (2000);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-89 (1977). For an interesting
application of the absolute privilege under Kentucky law see General Electric Co.
v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir, 1990); see also Vitauts M. Gulbis,
Annotation, Libel and Slander: Attorney's Statements to Parties Other Than
Alleged Defamed Party or its Agents, in Course ofExtrajudicial Investigation or
Preparation Relating to Pending or Anticipated Civil Litigation as Privileged, 23
A.L.R.4TH 932; Bernard E. Jacques, Defamation in an Employment Context:
Selected Issues, 625 PLI/Lrr 829, 847-48 (2000).
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investigating counsel, 7 who is frequently hired to report to regular in-house
or regular outside litigation counsel. The investigating counsel is, in effect,
preparing for the defense of the anticipated claim, even if it is likely that he
or she would be precluded from serving as trial counsel because of the
lawyer-witness rule. 8 The litigation privilege is founded on public policy
considerations-that claims be fully and fairly investigated and litigated.
Applying it to protect parties, witnesses, and investigators participating in
workplace claims makes sense, especially given the fact that many
investigations are required by law.
In addition, we draw the readers' attention to the recent Second Circuit
case of Malik v. Carrier Corp.9 In that case, an alleged sexual harasser
sued his employer unsuccessfully, alleging a battery of state tort claims.
The court rejected claims for "negligent investigation," negligent infliction
of emotional distress and tortious interference, finding, as a matter of law,
that they should not have been submitted to a juryf0 The court reasoned
that since "an employer's investigation of a sexual harassment complaint
is not a gratuitous or optional undertaking; under federal law, an em-
ployer's failure to investigate may allow a jury to impose liability on the
employer."9 "[C]orrective actions that a risk-averse employer might take
to comply with federal law [such as an investigation] may not give rise
to a negligence action, whether the rationale is couched in terms of breach,
legal duty, or privilege."'92 If such state claims were allowed to go to a jury,
87 See Jacques, supra note 86, at 849 (citing Trachsel v. Two Rivers Psychiatric
Hosp., 883 F. Supp. 442,444 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (plaintifffiled a sexual harassment
suit and accused harasser counterclaimed for defamation; statements in correspon-
dence sent by plaintiff's lawyer to co-defendant hospital before lawsuit was filed
were within the litigation privilege, an absolute privilege under Restatement § 586
and Missouri law); Peterson v. Ballard, 679 A.2d 657 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (a New Jersey case holding that the litigation privilege shields lawyers (and
presumably other investigators) investigating a sexual harassment claim from
actions for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or invasion of
privacy)).
88 Cf Harris, supra note 78, at 60.
89 Malik v. Carrier Corp., 202 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2000). This case has been noted
as significant in a number of publications. See, e.g., Delikat, supra note 82, at 490;
Jacques, supra note 86, at 331.
10 Malik, 202 F.3d at 100.
9'1d. at 105 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998);
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 1997); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782
F.2d 1094, 1104 (2d Cir. 1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2001)). 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(d) is a guideline issued by the EEOC which seemingly requires an
investigation by the employer. See Panken et al., supra note 81, at 1138.
92Malik, 202 F.3d at 106.
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virtually any employer investigation into allegations of sexual harassment
would expose the employer to liability. Such investigations forseeably
produce emotional distress-often in copious amounts-in alleged
harassers, whether guilty or innocent As with any investigation into
potentially embarrassing personal interactions, confidentiality is difficult
or impossible to maintain if all pertinent information is to be acquired
from all possible sources.
93
While the court decided the case based on its interpretation of Connecticut
law, finding no conflict between Connecticut and federal law, the court also
suggested that the result would be required by federal preemption. In other
words, one may argue that the result is compelled by federal law and policy
in every state, and in both state and federal court proceedings. 4 Note also
93 Id.; see also Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 1999)
(female sued under Title VII claiming that investigation of her alleged misconduct
complained of by male employees created embarrassment and hostile work
environment; summary judgment for employer;, implication that federal discrimina-
tion claim should not interfere with duty to investigate); McDonnell v. Cisneros,
84 F.3d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1996) (complaint under Title VII based on theory that
investigation of groundless charges ofsexual misconduct was faulty orunnecessar-
ily hostile, and got the rumor mill spinning, which injured the reputation of the
accuseds and was itself a form of sexual harassment; claims rejected because
entertaining such claims would place the employer "on a razor's edge"); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Lane, 31 S.W.3d 282,292-93 (Tex. App. 2000) (the alleged harasser
launched something like a defensive, if not preemptive, strike, by complaining that
his accuserhad been spreading rmors about him); MaryRose Strubbe,Application
ofFaragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth to Claims by
Accused Harassers, 1 ANN. 2000 ATLA-CLE 379 (2000).
94 See generally Theodora R. Lee, The Year in Review: Significant Develop-
ments, 637 PLI/Lrr 151 (2000). Logically, the same reasoning would preclude
similar suits brought by a disappointed victim of alleged sexual harassment or other
claimed discrimination who does not like the result of an internal investigation or
who claims that the investigation caused the claimant distress. In Torres v. Pisano,
116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997), the plaintiff complained of harassment but specifi-
cally asked that the information be kept confidential. Id. at 639. On the facts of the
case the court held that this relieved the employer of the obligation to investigate
or otherwise address the problem. On the other hand, the court also noted that in
most cases the employer would have an obligation to remedy the situation even if
the claimant wanted confidentiality. Id. Malik cites Torres and other cases for the
proposition that an employer must go forward with an investigation or risk liability
even if the alleged victim decides to withdraw the complaint, or otherwise urges
that the investigation be terminated or requests that his or her complaint be kept
confidential. Malik, 202 F.3d at 106-07.
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that the reasoning of the Malik court is fully consistent with arguments in
support of the litigation privilege. 5
VIII. How, AND WHY, ARE THE PRIVILEGES WAIVED?
Should the employer make testimonial use of a report of an internal
investigation, or other evidentiary materials, or put such materials in issue
by defensive pleadings, it is likely that the trial court will be all too willing
to hold that any privileges have been waived.96 This is so despite what some
have called the "dubious validity" of the doctrine of"at issue" waiver,97 and
academic criticism of its expansive application. 8
95See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
96 See Alan M. Klinger & James L. Pernard, An Update to a Comprehensive
Survey of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine By The
Honorable Alvin K Hellerstein, U.S.D.J., S.D.N.Y., SE63 ALI-ABA 201, 211
(1999) (citing cases critical of the breadth of the "at issue" waiver doctrine). See
also Harris, supra note 78 (discussing Harding v. Dana Transport, Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1996) (where investigation found no evidence of harassment,
a defense based on a prompt investigation waived the privilege)). Presumably, the
plaintiff in Harding proved discrimination, and the employer felt that it had to fall
back on the investigation. See hypothetical 2 in text below. Question: Does it make
any sense to say that an employer can be liable for an inadequate investigation even
where plaintiff fails to prove discrimination, harassment, or other misconduct?
Presumably not, but that is not how the cases are being tried these days! Presum-
ably the law only makes sense if the plaintiff is required to make out a prima facie
case. If the employer is convinced that plaintiff cannot do this, then why assert the
limited affirmative defense and waive the privileges? See the discussion of
Robinson v. Time Warner, infra note 130 and accompanying text.
Should a copy of the investigator's report be given to the complainant? This
may well result in waiver. Will the waiver extend to all aspects of the investigation,
and all materials generated as a part of the investigation? To what extent does the
investigator have a duty to the complainant to report back? Presumably any duty
would be limited to that necessary to insure that the complaint has been resolved
and to insure that the complaining party will be protected. (Of course, any letter of
reprimand sent to the offender probably will not be privileged, and may be
discoverable under the open records law, depending on the jurisdiction.) Does
reporting back to the complainant waive attorney-client privilege? The limited
reporting we have suggested as being "necessary" should not. Too much reporting
may very well result in waiver.
97Rhone-PoulencRorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863-64 (3d Cir.
1994) (doctrine of "dubious validity" since it would seem to require waiver any
time a party's state of mind is at issue).
98 Allen v. W. Point-Pepperell Inc., 848 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Expansive interpretation of 'at issue' waiver... has recently been the subject of
significant legal and academic criticism.").
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This Article will discuss the reasons why an employer might want to
avoid waiver by not using the report as an "affirmative defense" or by
otherwise putting it in issue. Consider the following statement, which is
taken from a speaker's handout at a recent conference:
Should the internal investigation be conducted so as to protect it from
disclosure? It may be that the answer to this question is no. It is often the
case that the purpose of an investigation is to protect the institution by
providing a basis for decision-making. In other words, the purpose of the
investigation is to determine how the institution should respond to a
complaint and that the institution will ultimately want to rely on that
investigation if it is called upon to defend the response at a later time.9'
It may be that an institution's constituents (in the case of a university,
the constituents would include the faculty and students as well as the
administrators) might argue that for policy and public relations purposes,
no privileges should be claimed. While the authors view this approach as
unrealistic and undesirable, it is nevertheless defensible, assuming that
appropriate thought has been given to the consequences. The excerpt above
does not seem to be based on such a fundamental policy analysis. Instead,
it seems to be based on the notion that waiver is inevitable, if not desirable,
in all cases. Our criticism of the notion that waiver is inevitable, if not
desirable, in all cases is based on three considerations: (1) that the privilege
can be set up in the first instance, leaving an informed decision on waiver
for a later time; (2) that the employers' so-called "affirmative defenses" are
much more limited, and much less available, than many counsel assume
they are; and (3) that the reality of litigation is that following waiver and
production, plaintiffs' counsel may put the internal report on trial,
subjecting it to an unrealistic degree of scrutiny, thereby confusing the jury
as to the real issues of the case. For example, a plaintiff may convince the
jury that there was some defect in the investigation, and that proof of that
fact is the equivalent of proof of employer liability.
The first consideration stated above, that the privilege can be set up,
leaving time later for an informed decision on waiver, seems obvious. You
cannot claim privilege if you have not done the work to set it up. Why not
do the work, and consider the issue of waiver later, after a consideration of
all the circumstances? As one commentator has stated:
9 Speaker's Handout, June 2000 NACUA Conference (from author's file,
regrettably misplaced and unavailable for further attribution).
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[A]s the facts develop, the employer may not need to establish [an
affirmative defense like] prompt remedial action, and will instead wish to
keep all aspects of the investigation shielded by the attorney-client or
work-product privileges. Accordingly, the attorney should advise the
client on steps to take to preserve the privilege. Even though the client
may later decide to waive the privilege, it will not have the luxury of
making that choice if the privilege does not attach in the first instance.1°°
We now proceed to the second and third considerations stated above.
Consider the following scenarios:
(1) Employer suspects wrongdoing or alleged wrongdoing has been
reported. Employer promptly conducts an investigation and all steps are
taken to preserve all privileges. The investigators find no evidence in
support of the claims, or concludes that the plaintiff will be unable to meet
the burden of proof. Employer wants to use the report to prove that no
misconduct took place.
An attempt to use the report to prove that there was, in fact, no
wrongdoing raises several points which are often overlooked. First, this is
a hearsay use of the report, and the report should not be admissible for that
purpose.' On the other hand, an attempted use will lead to claims of
waiver of any privilege that would otherwise be available; and any bad
facts contained in the report will be admissible as admissions. Therefore,
why not just defend the case, using the report as a road map for the
defense?"0 2
(2) Same facts, but assume for the time being"0 3 that under the
substantive law the employer is liable only if the employer knew or should
'oGoebel & Nickerson, supra note 71, at 28.
101 See, e.g., Berrierv. Bizer, 57 S.W.3d 271,276 (Ky. 2001). See also Williams
v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 00-3256, 2001 WL 1006288, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 24,
2001) (investigator's notes of interviews would be hearsay if offered for the truth
of the matter asserted but may be admissible on the issue of the employer's
response under Farager/Ellerth). Unfortunately, some outside counsel seem to
think that a report of an internal investigation finding no misconduct can be offered
as substantive proof of the facts asserted therein, despite the rather obvious hearsay
problem. Some counsel even make the mistake of believing that a solid investiga-
tion will persuade a plaintiff's counsel that he or she has no case!
'02 "[T]he employer defending a workplace harassment lawsuit must prepare a
thorough and vigorous defense to serve with equal effectiveness the dual options
of jury trial or strategic settlement." Van Detta, supra note 79, at 265.
3 Suspend, for a moment, your knowledge of, and any enthusiasm for, the
more limited Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense.
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have known of the wrongdoing and failed to act reasonably. Again,
consideration should be given to whether the plaintiff can meet the burden
of proof. If so, the report may provide a defense under the law governing
liability, because it can establish a lack of notice, or because the investiga-
tion was part of an appropriate remedial response. Of course, use of the
report for these purposes may result in at issue waiver, but waiver may be
the best course of conduct.
(3) Same facts, and the issue is whether the employer should be liable
for punitive damages.' Again, counsel should first determine if the
plaintiff can make a case for punitives. If so, the report may be used as
evidence of appropriate and prompt remediation, or even good faith
reliance on advice of counsel, which might defeat claims of oppression or
malice. Again, putting the report at issue may make some sense, although
waiver may result.
(4) Same facts as in number three above, but the case is in an
Ellerth/Faragherjurisdiction, and counsel determines that those cases will
apply to the claim. Here is where we have to think. As the following
discussion points out, the new test under Ellerth/Faragher has more than
one "prong." Can all of the prongs of the test be met? What if time and
resource limitations, or other problems, prevented the investigation from
being completed or resulted in a level of uncertainty as to the findings? If
there are serious doubts along these lines, what is the point of putting the
report in issue and waiving otherwise applicable privileges? Would it not
be more sensible to hang on to the privilege and make plaintiffprove a case
without the assistance provided by any report of investigation? Of course,
if the privilege has not been preserved, counsel will not have the luxury of
making sensible tactical decisions.
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,"°5 and Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth °6 the United States Supreme Court held that under the federal
Civil Rights Act:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a superior with immediate
' Insofar as punitive damages are concerned, Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999), indicates that an employer will notbe vicariously
liable for punitive damages if the employees's actions are contrary to the em-
ployer's "good faith efforts to comply with Title VII." On the conflicts that may
arise if the employer's trial counsel has been involved in the formulation,
implementation, and application of the employer's policies see Van Detta, supra
note 79, at 352-53.
los Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
106 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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(or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirma-
tive defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance
of the evidence .... The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.... No affi-mative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in tangible employment action, such
as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 0 7
One may well ask why counsel for employers are so enthusiastic about
the prospects of asserting this affirmative defense. Previously there was no
agreement on the rule governing employer liability for harassment
committed by a supervisor. The lower federal courts had been applying
"widely varying standards."'0" In cases in which the Faragher/Ellerth
107 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
108 George L. Lenard & Christopher A. Ott, Recent Developments in Sexual
Harassment Law, 56 J. Mo. B. 84, 85 (2000):
The cases indicated a variety of theories for liability, including: (1) the
employer is liable ifthe harassment can be said to have involved a quidpro
quo threat or promise, even if unfulfilled; (2) the employer is liable if the
harassment can in some sense be said to have been within the harasser's
scope of employment or apparent authority; (3) the employer is liable if the
supervisor can be said to have been aided by his supervisory authority in
accomplishing the harassment; and (4) the employer is liable if it knew or
should have known of the harassment, but failed to take prompt and
appropriate remedial action.
Id. at 85 n.19.
While Farragher and Ellerth have created uniform rules for employers for
supervisor harassment under federal law, state law is not uniform. See Dep't of
Health Servs. v. Superior Court (McGinnis), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). In this case, the court opined that there is no FarragherEllerth affirmative
defense to supervisor harassment under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act ("FEHA"); that Title VII does not specifically address employer
liability for supervisor harassment, but the FEHA does; that under the language of
the FEHA "Harassment by a nonsupervisory coworker is unlawful only if the
employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment and failed to correct it
[compare discussion in text at supra note 94] ... [but] ... [n]o such limitation
exists for harassment by a supervisor or agent'; that under California law an
employer is strictly liable for supervisor harassment; and that the employer's
knowledge and action are irrelevant! Therefore, the case for preserving attorney-
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defense potentially applies,"0 9 the defense will be more limited than
whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment.
There will be no affirmative defense if tangible employment action has
already been taken, so those cases can be set aside. In the remaining cases,
both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense will have to be satisfied.
Addressing the first prong, this means that there must be effective
complaint and investigatory procedures, and that investigations must be
timely.110 This might not appear to be unreasonable at first blush, but the
fact of the matter is that few public institutions are going to have sufficient
and adequately trained staff to investigate every complaint as immediately
and as thoroughly as it will be argued, after the fact, that it should have
been investigated. Indeed, case law suggests that courts may allow jurors
to second guess investigators, making much ado ofperceived "investigatory
flaws"' I and allowing juries to find liability in the event that the employer
and the employer's investigatory agent make assessments of the credibility
of witnesses which disagree with the jury's ultimate assessments.
The point is that in a great number of cases, the employer's good faith
effort to investigate is not going to be sufficient.1 Furthermore, of the
client privilege and workproduct during internal investigations in California would
seem to be all the more important.
'09 See discussion supra note 11.
10 Stoner & Ryan, supra note 11, at 662 ("When complaints are made,
employers mustrespond to thembypromptly interviewing the accuser, the accused,
and witnesses, gathering any documentary or other evidence, and documenting the
investigatory process.").
.1 Compare the more sensible approach of the court in Silva v. Lucy Stores,
Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 256 (1998), in which an alleged harasser, Silva, sued the
employer after the employer terminated him for violating the company's sexual
harassment policy. Silva attacked the adequacy of the employer's investigation of
him, contending that the employer's good faith belief that he engaged in harassing
behavior was no defense to his wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 273-75. The court
rejected each allegation of investigatory flaws, noting that "[w]hile the investiga-
tion was not perfect, it was appropriate given that it was conducted 'under the
exigencies of the workaday world and without benefit of the slow-moving
machinery of a contested trial."' Id. at 275.
" 2 See Barbara Barish Brown et al., Recent Significant Developments in the
Law ofHarassment, VLR994 ALI-ABA 377 (1999); Harris, supra note 78, at 56,
57 (no affirmative defense if supervisor has already taken adverse action; the
investigation, in and of itself, is not sufficient to preclude liability, because there
-must be a timely remedy); Alan M. Koral, Practice Pointers on Proving the
Affirmative Defense EstablishedBy Ellerth and Faragher Step Two: Proof That the
Employer TookReasonable Steps to Correct Sexual Harassment, 606 PLI/Lrr 215,
257-58 (1999). See also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 00-3256, 2001 WL
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remaining cases-cases in which the employer has investigated promptly
and taken appropriate action-the affirmative defense may still not be
available."' If we read Faragher and Ellerth literally, unless the employee
acts unreasonably, the employer will still be liable, regardless of the fact
that it has acted reasonably."
4
Consider the recent Sixth Circuit case of Barna v. City of Cleveland.15
The facts of the case arose as follows: A commercial painter employed by
1006288, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 24,2001) (investigator's notes of interviews would
be hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted but may be admissible on
the issue of the employer's response under FaragerEllerth, but presumably not if
plaintiff has suffered a tangible employment action as a result of the supervisor's
harassment).
I3 See Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 881-84 (N.D. Ind.
1998) and 33 F. Supp. 2d 729 (N.D. Ind. 1998). In this case, the court held that the
university employer satisfied the first prong oftheFaragher-Burlington affirmative
defense by doing a prompt and expansive investigation of the victim's complaint
which led to the resignation of the harasser (the University Chancellor!). The
University's affirmative defense nevertheless failed because the university had
constructive knowledge that there had been previous misconduct and complaints
involving other victims. This knowledge was considered to be proof that the
University had not acted reasonably to prevent the harassment by responding to
previous complaints! Fall, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 881-82. Needless to say, this
reinforces the notion that the university may have to be more vigilant or escalate
its response to "repeat-offenders" or alleged harassers "with a history." But see
Bank One, Ky. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540, 545-46 (Ky. 2001) (Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense available in actions brought under K.R.S. § 344.040; but
evidence that employer put on notice of employee's sexual harassing conduct
because of perpetrator's "widespread" past conduct, "even though [the employer]
may not have known that this particular plaintiff was one of the perpetrator's
victims" was a triable issue of fact which precluded grant of sunnry judgment for
employer). The Fall and Bank One cases serve as a warning of the potential
conflicts that may be faced by an in-house investigator who has received
complaints in the past about the alleged harasser during the investigator's (or, in
the case of an outside law firm's or outside investigator's) long-term relationship
with the employer client.
114 This point was not lost on the Supreme Court of Michigan. In Chambers v.
Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 2000), the court refused to follow Faragher
and Ellerth in interpreting the Michigan Civil Rights statutes, at least in the context
of hostile environment harassment. The court not only noted the fact that under
Faragher and Ellerth the employer would have to prove that it was not negligent
and that the employee was negligent to avoid vicarious liability, but also that the
whole effect was to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 917.
,,5 Bama v. City of Cleveland, No. 96-3971, 96-4178, 97-4130, 1998 WL
939884 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998).
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the City of Cleveland sued under Title VII, alleging that her supervisor
sexually harassed her and created a hostile work environment. The plaintiff
left her job without explanation of adverse notice to anyone at the
recreation center which was her jobsite." 6 She testified that she had
attempted to reach her supervisor's superior, the Commissioner of
Recreation, but without success.'17 She did complain to her union, which
notified the City's EEO office. Following established procedures, the EEO
manager reviewed her complaint, spoke with her on "numerous occasions,"
and attempted to get all of the details of the harassment. The plaintiff did
not inform the EEO manager of all of the details to which she would later
testify at trial (particularly the most spectacular, which included her
supervisors alleged demand for oral sex).'8 The EEO manager interviewed
witnesses, and concluded that none of them corroborated the plaintiffs
complaint. However, one of these witnesses, Joyce Grayson, would later
testify that the supervisor made "sexual overtures" to the plaintiff and was
"rude" to her. The EEO manager conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing. The
supervisor denied the plaintiffs allegations. No evidence was received
corroborating plaintiffs claims. At the end of the hearingthe EEO
manager concluded that he could not confirm or deny the allegations and
issued a report to that effect, noting that the supervisor had no prior
disciplinary record."' The only action taken was to inform the supervisor
of the employer's policies and to give him informational literature. At
trial, the plaintiff testified to the conduct of which she had not informed
the EEO officer. Furthermore, Joyce Grayson testified that she had told
the EEO investigator that the supervisor had made some sexually sug-
gestive comments to plaintiff. The EEO manager disputed this testi-
mony.1
20
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the jury was free to believe Grayson
and disbelieve the EEO manager, and on that basis was free to base liability
on the City's failure to take some disciplinary action against the
supervisor.' 2' Furthermore, the court ruled that the fact that plaintiff had
left her job before notifying the defendant of her troubles was beside the
point.'
22
16 Id. at *2.
17Id.
118Id.
"9Id.
120 Id. at *4.
'21 Id.
12 Id. at * 5.
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One is free to agree with the results of Barna, and free to demand a
higher level ofprofessionalismin investigations. However, doubts linger."2
If we accept these results, are we saying that the employer may not trust in
the judgment of trained and experienced employees when it comes to
matters of credibility? Just because a jury resolves a credibility issue
against a corporate investigator and against an employee witness, does that
mean the employer's response was unreasonable?'24 Shouldn't the
employee have to be more forthcoming about the details of the alleged
harassment? Is an inconclusive investigation that does not support strong
disciplinary action automatically defective? If so, does that mean that
alleged harassers automatically have lesser rights than their alleged victims,
and are to be disciplined on inconclusive evidence? Exactly what level of
action would have satisfied the Sixth Circuit?" 5 One thing, at least, is clear:
The affirmative defense that the company investigated is overvalued. In any
event, "management, not... [the] ... investigator, should determine the
most appropriate action to be taken in light of the facts available, which
maybe... inconclusive."' 26 "All decisionmakers would be well-advised to
read the actual interview notes, declarations or other statements, other
important documents gathered during the investigation, and personnel files
of critical witnesses if credibility is at issue." '27
" Many employers willnothave theresources ora sufficientnumberoftrained
personnel to investigate claims as thoroughly and quickly as current case law seems
to require. See generally Ruark, supra note 82, at 575.
1224The employer knows the investigating employee, and may reasonably place
considerable trust in the investigator's judgment and assessment of the credibility
of the complainant, the alleged harasser, and other witnesses. But the investigating
employee will be a stranger to the jury, and will be the focus of "plaintiffs
onslaught to undermine [the] employer's Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense."
Van Detta, supra note 79, at 349-50.
[I]t... [is] ... the dream of every employment lawyer [plaintiff's counsel]
to have the opportunity to parade his or her opposing counsel before ajury
to cross-examine him or her thoroughly and aggressively about everything
that went behind the "polished" conclusion or "sanitized" final report that
personifies the investigation to most employers.
Id. at 310. Of course, counsel as witness scenarios raise concerns under Model
Rule 3.7 and Model Code DRs 5-101(B) and 102.
125 For suggested alternative actions, see Nancy L. Abell, Conducting an
Effective Workplace Investigation, VLR994 ALI-ABA 459, 501 (1999).
1.Id. at 501.
27 Id. at 500. In the authors' experience, it is sometimes difficult to get outside
counsel to pay sufficient attention to the actual witness statements and other
evidence documenting findings in reports of internal investigations.
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The district court opinion in Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc. 128 is most
instructive. In that case, an employee complained of racial discrimination
in the workplace. The employer hired outside counsel, Levien, to conduct
an internal investigation of the complaint. Levien apparently found no
discrimination. When the plaintiff later sued under Title VII, he sought to
depose and question Levien about the substance of his interviews with
Time Warner employees." 9 Citing Upjohn and Carter v. Cornell Univer-
sity, the court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to question Levien or
any Time Warner employee about the questions Levien asked or the
answers provided during the employee interviews. 3 ' Moreover, the court
ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to any notes taken by Levien or his
assistants, nor would he be allowed to review the final investigative report
prepared by Levien. 3' Both the attomey-client and work product privileges
had been properly invoked. Furthermore, since Time Warner had not raised
the adequacy of the investigation as a defense, there was no waiver. Since
it was Time Warner's position that the plaintiff had not been the victim of
discrimination, it was not necessary for it to claim that it was somehow
insulated from liability by the investigation. Time Warner had not put the
adequacy of the report in issue.'
Again, the lesson seems clear:
[A]s the facts develop, the employer may not need to establish prompt
remedial action, and will instead wish to keep all aspects of the investiga-
tion shielded by the attorney-client or work-product privileges .... Even
though the client may later decide to waive the privilege, it will not have
12 1 Robinson v. Time Warner, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
'"igd. at 146. See discussionsupra note 102 forthe tactical reasons behind such
fishing expeditions.
130 Robinson, 187 F.R.D. at 146.
131 Id.
' Id. The plaintiff also sought unsuccessfully, to claim waiver and obtain
production of the materials under Federal Rule of Evidence 612 on the theory that
Levien had reviewed the materials before attending a deposition. Id. at 147. It is
worth noting that the evidence rules of many states differ from the federal rule. See,
e.g., K.R.E. 612. For a case similar to Robinson, see Sealy v. Gruntal & Co., No.
94 Civ. 7948, 1998 WL 698257, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998) (by dropping a
defense asserting the adequacy of the investigation, waiver could be avoided).
The possibility of"at issue" waiver canpresent a conundrum of pleading. Does
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), and a too-liberal view of at issue pleading
mean that counsel must raise remedial action as a defense before counsel knows
whether he or she wants to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege?
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the luxury of making that choice if the privilege does not attach in the first
instance.
133
IX. WHAT ABOUT THE "OPEN RECORDS" PROBLEM?
Open records, or "sunshine" laws, are complicated, and vary from state
to state. Counsel needs to be very careful in making too hasty a generaliza-
tion about the applicability of such laws. Admittedly, some courts have
given claims of attorney-client privilege and work product surprisingly
short shrift in the absence of specific exceptions for them. Fortunately, in
Kentucky, the applicable statute was amended in 1994 to make it clear that
documents need not be provided under the open records law if they are
covered by the privileges. Specifically, the statute provides that "no court
shall authorize the inspection by any party of any materials pertaining to
civil litigation beyond that which is provided by the Rules of Civil
Procedure governing pretrial discovery."' 134 In other words, the work
product rule contained in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides an
exemption under the open records law. 35 Furthermore, the statute provides
that "The following public records are excluded [from the requirements of
the open records law] ... Public records or information the disclosure of
which is prohibited or restricted or otherwise made confidential by
enactment of the General Assembly."'136 Since the attorney-client privilege
set forth in K.R.E. 503 (which incorporated Upjohn) wasjointly enacted by
the Kentucky Supreme Court and the General Assembly, K.R.E. 503
materials should be exempt from disclosure.3 7
In 1999, the Attorney General of Kentucky issued an opinion which
ruled that materials relating to a sexual harassment complaint and
133 Goebel & Nickerson, supra note 71, at 28.
134 K.R.S. § 61.878(1) (Michie1993).
131 Accord OAG 95-ORD-18 (Kentucky Attorney General opinion). Unfortu-
nately, the Kentucky Attorney General tends to construe this provision narrowly.
136 K.R.S. § 61.878(1)(1).
131 See Hahn v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 2000-CA-001296-M, 2001 WL
815138, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. July 20, 2001) (unpublished and not final) (citing
UNDERWOOD & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 67, at 503); Meriwether v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Gov't No. 2000-CA-002050-MR, 2002 WL 10192,
at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2002); accord OAG 97-ORD-66 (Kentucky Attorney
General opinion). In Kentucky, at least, the legislature wouldprobablynothave the
power to abrogate the attorney-client privilege. The court jealously guards its
exclusive power to regulate the legal profession and formulate the rules of
evidence.
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investigation against an employee of Western Kentucky University had to
be produced under the open records law upon the request of a newspaper
reporter.3 ' The opinion made no reference to the attorney-client privilege,
perhaps because the University did not assert the privilege or structure its
investigation in a way that would allow it to assert the privilege. The
opinion noted the fact that the University "ha[d] exercised considerable
circumspection in an attempt to shield the complainant and [the accused
harasser] from public scrutiny,"'39 that important privacy interests were at
stake, particularly since the complainant had not filed a lawsuit, and that
disclosure would have a "chilling effect" on the University's ability to
investigate complaints. 40 According to the opinion, none of this matters.
No reference was made to the attorney-client privilege, nor to the Kentucky
statute stating that documents need not be provided under the open records
law if they are covered by privileges. Later, the opinion was ordered "Not
To Be Published."''
This sort of confusion should be addressed by the Kentucky legislature.
Appropriate statutory language can be found in other states. For example,
a Florida statute dealing with university personnel records provides that:
(1) Each university shall adopt rules prescribing the content and
custody of limited-access records that the university may maintain on its
employees. Such limited-access records are confidential and exempt from
the provisions of § 119.07(1). Such records are limited to the following:
(2) Notwithstanding the foregoing, any records or portions thereof
which are otherwise confidential by law shall continue to be exempt from
the provisions of § 119.07(1). In addition, for sexual harassment
.investigations, portions of such records which identify the complainant,
a witness, or information which could reasonably lead to the identifica-
tion of the complainant or a witness are limited-access records.
142
3I OAG 99-ORD-39 (Kentucky Attorney General opinion).
139 Id. at6.
140Id. at 17.
141 Paul Van Booven, Associate Counsel for the University of Kentucky, points
out that some public agencies do not use lawyers to deal with their open records
requests or denials, so the matter of privilege does not get raised. He is of the
opinion that the privileges should be recognized in the open records context if they
are properly set up and raised.
142FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.253 (West 1998) (emphasis added).
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